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769 
FOURTH AMENDMENT INQUIRIES: WHEN OFFICERS ARE 
NOT JUSTIFIED TO APPROACH A VEHICLE 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK                                  
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT 
People v. Laviscount1 
(decided April 23, 2014) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States of America has become one of the most po-
larized countries, as events involving suspicious circumstances seem 
to be scrutinized more often.  With the troubling occurrences in re-
cent years involving police conduct, it is essential that the coverage 
and dialogues over such events continue.  Both the New York and 
Federal courts will exclude evidence when it is obtained from an in-
appropriate search.  Each system seeks to promote the same goal—
protecting the public from arbitrary intrusions by the police, but at the 
same time encouraging good policing to defend against crime.  This 
is true even though each system applies a different, but similar stand-
ard when evaluating police conduct. 
This Case Note will analyze situations where an officer ap-
proaches and investigates an individual who is not engaging in un-
lawful conduct at the time of the inquiry.  More specifically, the issue 
presented in People v. Laviscount was whether an officer was justi-
fied in soliciting information about an individual’s whereabouts when 
parked in a remote area where a vehicle would not typically be locat-
ed.2 
 
1 984 N.Y.S.2d 394 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014). 
2 Id. at 396-97. 
1
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II. FACTS 
On November 7, 2008, at 2:45 a.m., Shamari Laviscount and 
a female passenger were legally parked in a remote area where a ve-
hicle would not normally be parked.3  Officer Michael Ranolde and 
his partner observed them and proceeded to drive alongside the de-
fendant’s vehicle.4  Ranolde noticed Laviscount remove an object 
from his dashboard and toss it below his seat.5  Based on their intui-
tion, the officers exited their unmarked police car and advanced to-
wards Laviscount’s vehicle.6  While questioning Laviscount, Ranolde 
witnessed him take off his gloves and throw them in the backseat.7  
Subsequently, Ranolde inspected the car with his flashlight, but he 
found nothing out of the ordinary.8  Both the defendant and the fe-
male passenger, after being asked to exit their vehicle, complied with 
Ranolde’s request and were escorted to the back of Laviscount’s ve-
hicle.9  Ranolde verified the defendant’s identification while his part-
ner supervised the two potential suspects.10  After further questioning, 
Ranolde flashed his light on the female passenger’s black purse and 
observed what looked like the handle of a gun.11  Ranolde immediate-
ly snatched the purse and confirmed the existence of a handgun.12  
Ranolde then instructed the defendant and the female passenger to 
remain still, but Laviscount denied that the gun was his and fled the 
scene.13 
Laviscount was arrested shortly after his flight.14  The police 
searched his car and recovered various suspicious items, in addition 
to the gun found in the female passenger’s purse.15  Laviscount was 
subsequently indicted for criminal possession of a weapon in the sec-
 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 396. 
5 Id. 









15 See id.  (“A subsequent search of the defendant’s car resulted in the seizure of a glove, a 
ski mask, and sunglasses.  In addition, the gun and a bullet were recovered from the purse.”). 
2
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ond degree.16  Laviscount moved to suppress the physical evidence 
found at the scene, but the Supreme Court of Queens County denied 
his motion.17  At trial, a jury convicted him of the charged crime.18  
The defendant appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, 
Second Department, arguing that the lower court had erred in deny-
ing his motion to suppress the material evidence recovered during the 
search of his vehicle.19 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In reversing Laviscount’s conviction, the Appellate Division, 
Second Department relied on a four-level test announced by the New 
York Court of Appeals in People v. De Bour.20  This test, commonly 
known as the De Bour test, established the level of inquiry that is ap-
propriate for a police-initiated encounter and determined whether an 
officer has exceeded the bounds of his or her authority.21  First, an of-
ficer has the authority to ask an individual for information only when 
“supported by an objective credible reason, not necessarily indicative 
of criminality.”22  Second, if the officer can provide a founded suspi-
cion that the suspect is about to engage in criminal activity, then the 
officer can conduct a more exhaustive inquiry.23  Third, a police of-
ficer is allowed to forcibly stop and confine the suspect if the officer 
has a reasonable suspicion that the accused “is committing, has 
committed, or is about to commit a crime.”24  Finally, the officer is 
empowered to place the suspect under arrest if supported by probable 
cause of criminal wrongdoing.25 
When applying the De Bour test to the defendant in 
Laviscount, the court concluded that the officers were not justified in 
approaching the defendant’s vehicle.26  The court did not accept 
 




20 Id. at 395-96; see also People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976). 





26 Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 397; see People v. McIntosh, 755 N.E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. 
2001) (the first level of the De Bour test is triggered once an officer, in a police-initiated en-
3
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Ranolde’s rationale, finding that parking a vehicle in a remote area 
during the early morning hours does not provide an objective basis to 
inquire into the owner’s whereabouts.27  The court also rejected 
Ranolde’s theory that his actions were warranted when the defendant 
tossed an object below his seat.28  However, the court proceeded to 
analyze Ranolde’s actions as if he had satisfied the first and second 
levels of De Bour and still found that no reasonable suspicion of 
criminal conduct had been present.29  Ranolde did not uncover any 
criminal behavior when he flashed his light inside of Laviscount’s 
vehicle.30  Further, there had been no evidence that established that 
the defendant had committed a traffic violation, which could have 
justified the inquiry.31  Thus, Ranolde and his partner were not per-
mitted to approach the vehicle, let alone conduct an intrusive 
search.32 
IV. THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
A. The Landmark Opinion: Terry v. Ohio 
Eight years prior to the De Bour decision, the Supreme Court 
of the United States decided Terry v. Ohio.33  Terry is considered to 
be a turning point in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and forms the 
basis of extensive analyses in both federal and state court opinions.  
The central dispute in Terry regarded the limits placed on a police of-
 
gagement, requests information about the individual or his or her intentions). 
27 Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 397; see People v. Miles, 918 N.Y.S.2d 594, 595 (App. 
Div. 2d Dep’t 2011) (holding that the officers did not have an objective, plausible justifica-
tion to advance towards the vehicle, question the defendant, and use a flashlight to examine 
the vehicle, other than the fact that the vehicle was parked in an area known for narcotic and 
gang related occurrences). 
28 Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 397. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 396; see People v. Harrison, 443 N.E.2d 447, 477 (N.Y. 1982) (finding that “once 
a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may or-
der the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscrip-
tion of unreasonable searches and seizures”) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 
106, 111 n.6 (1977)). 
32 Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 397. 
33 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
4
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ficer when he or she is investigating suspicious activity.34 
A jury convicted John Terry of carrying a concealed weapon, 
requiring him to spend a minimum of one year in prison.35  Accord-
ing to the testimony of Officer Martin McFadden, around 2:30 p.m. 
on October 31, 1963, Terry and his friend repeatedly looked into a 
store window.36  After observing Terry and his companion, McFad-
den believed the men were scoping out a place to rob and worried 
that they might be carrying a firearm.37  After concluding that the cir-
cumstances provided a basis for his inquiry, McFadden approached 
the suspects, identified himself as a police officer and questioned 
them about their identity.38  The suspects were not cooperative, and 
McFadden then proceeded to take hold of Terry and searched his 
clothing.39  The officer found a pistol in Terry’s coat pocket.40  Terry 
was arrested, along with his friend, and both men were charged with 
carrying a concealed weapon.41 
The Supreme Court held that an officer is empowered to ap-
proach, question, and even conduct a limited search of a suspect 
when the officer reasonably believes, based on an objective notion 
and only after identifying himself, that the suspect could be armed 
and presently dangerous.42  In reaching this conclusion, however, the 
 
34 Id. at 4; see id. at 9 (referring to the more narrow issue in Terry, which was “whether in 
all the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, his right to personal security was violat-
ed by an unreasonable search and seizure”). 
35 Id. at 4. 
36 Id. at 5-6. 
He saw one of the men leave the other one and walk southwest on Huron 
Road, past some stores.  The man paused for a moment and looked in a 
store window, then walked on a short distance, turned around and 
walked back toward the corner, pausing once again to look in the same 
store window.  He rejoined his companion at the corner, and the two 
conferred briefly.  Then the second man went through the same series of 
motions, strolling down Huron Road, looking in the same window, walk-
ing on a short distance, turning back, peering in the store window, and 
returning to confer with the first man at the corner.  The two men repeat-
ed this ritual alternatively between five and six times apiece—in all, 
roughly a dozen trips. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 6. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 6-7. 
39 Id. at 7. 
40 Id.  McFadden also found a firearm on another suspect.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 7. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 30. 
5
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Court had to determine “whether the officer’s action was justified at 
its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”43  
This test was applicable when a citizen has been searched and seized, 
as illustrated when McFadden took hold of Terry and explored the 
exterior of his attire.44 
When analyzing any justification for a police-initiated in-
quiry, the courts must weigh a suspect’s freedoms against any gov-
ernmental interest that empowered the officer to conduct an investi-
gation in the first place.45  An officer is warranted to approach a 
suspect if the circumstances indicate “specific and articulable facts 
which, taken with rational interferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant the intrusion.”46  This inquiry must be based on an objective 
standard, which requires the officer to provide more than a hunch of 
criminal wrongdoing.47  Assuming the officer is authorized to ap-
proach the suspect, the Court is required to evaluate the scope of the 
intrusion based on the totality of the circumstances.48 
The Court in Terry acknowledged McFadden’s strong interest 
in self-protection, especially in a situation where officers are required 
to make sudden decisions.49  However, Terry’s constitutional right to 
 
We merely hold that where a police officer observes unusual conduct 
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that 
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is 
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of 
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and 
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the 
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safe-
ty, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to 
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons 
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. 
Id. 
43 Id. at 20. 
44 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.  A person has been “seized” when his or her ability to leave is 
restrained and such person is restricted to the confines of the immediate vicinity.  Id. at 16. 
45 Id. at 20-21. 
46 Id. at 21. 
47 Id. at 21.  The appropriate standard is whether “the facts available to the officer at the 
moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that 
the action take was appropriate[.]”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. 
48 Id. at 28-29. 
49 Id. at 28.  “When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious 
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous . . . it would ap-
pear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures . . . 
6
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be free from an intimidating and frightening experience must not be 
overlooked.50  When balancing these competing interests, the Court 
concluded that McFadden’s actions did not offend Terry’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.51  The officer’s objective basis that the defend-
ants were about to engage in criminal activity was justified after wit-
nessing their suspicious coordinated approach to potentially rob the 
local store.52  In addition, McFadden did not resort to intrusive 
measures when searching Terry.53  The officer’s search was limited in 
scope to Terry’s outer clothing.54 
B. High Crime Areas 
When analyzing police conduct, “[a]n individual’s presence in 
an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to 
support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is 
committing a crime.”55  For example, in United States v. Beck,56 the 
court held that two officers were not authorized to approach and in-
quire into the defendant’s whereabouts when parked in a high crime 
area at 4:00 p.m.57  Officer Spears and his partner were patrolling in a 
primarily African American community known for criminal activity 
when they came across the defendant’s parked car.58  The defendant 
and passenger, who were both African American, were seated in the 
vehicle with the engine running when the officers pulled up next to 
the vehicle and inquired as to their reasons for being in the neighbor-
hood.59  The patrolmen noticed the defendant discreetly pass an item 
to the passenger, and they parked their vehicle to investigate fur-
ther.60  As they were parking the vehicle, Spears noticed the driver 
 
to neutralize the threat of physical harm.”  Id. at 24. 
50 Id. at 24-25. 
51 Terry, 392 U.S. at 31. 
52 Id. at 28. 
53 Id. at 30. 
54 Id. 
55 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
56 602 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1979). 
57 Id. at 727, 729. 
58 Id. at 727.  Officer Spears provided evidence that he had been familiar with every per-
son in the local neighborhood based on his extensive experience.  Id. 
59 Id.  The officers testified that the two men were very nervous.  Beck, 602 F.2d at 727. 
60 Id. 
7
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toss a “cigarette” onto the street.61  The officers exited their vehicle 
and Spears observed the “cigarette” next to the defendant’s vehicle.62  
Based on those observations, Spears told the men to exit the car and 
forced the defendant to sit in the police vehicle.63  Spears recovered 
the cigarette, which contained marijuana.64  The officers also found 
two syringes, one on the street and another in plain view in the vehi-
cle, and a bag of marijuana.65 
The court of appeals found that the officers lacked an objec-
tive basis to approach the defendant’s vehicle in the first place.66  The 
court acknowledged that the patrolmen had stopped and seized the 
vehicle, according to Terry, when stopping next to the car and pre-
venting the men from leaving.67  The encounter took place in a high 
crime neighborhood, but “[t]here [was] nothing inherently suspicious 
about two black men sitting in a parked car, with or without the en-
gine running, on a street in a black neighborhood on a midsummer 
afternoon.”68  The defendant had neither violated any traffic law nor 
was there any reason to believe that the men were engaged or about 
to engage in criminal conduct.69  The officers’ mere hunch could not 
provide a basis to justify their actions.70  Circumstances like those in 
Beck are insufficient to justify a search. 
C. Furtive Movements 
The federal courts have discussed the implications of when an 
individual nervously attempts to avoid an officer or conceal some-





64 Beck, 602 F.2d at 727. 
65 Id.  Subsequently, the two men were placed under arrest.  Id. 
66 Id. at 729. 
67 Id. at 728-29.  The court stated that a “stop” occurs “whenever a police officer accosts 
an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away.”  Beck, 602 F.2d at 728 (quoting Ter-
ry, 392 U.S. at 16). 
68 Id. at 729. 
69 Id.  The court stated “there was no evidence of recent crimes in the neighborhood, no 
reason to suspect that Beck or his passenger were wanted by the police, and no other reason 
to believe anything unusual was taking place.”  Id. 
70 Id. 
71 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 511 F.3d 87, 89 (1st Cir. 2007) (intentionally and 
nervously attempting to hide a firearm from the officers in his vehicle); United States v. 
8
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ous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable 
suspicion.”72  However, these movements alone do not automatically 
indicate that criminal conduct is present.73 
For instance, in United States v. Spinner,74 the court conclud-
ed that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
search based on the defendant’s nervous actions.75  The defendant’s 
vehicle had been stationed in an area where parking was not permit-
ted and officers had recently made drug related arrests.76  The officers 
approached the defendant, who was fidgeting in the back seat, and 
told him that he needed to move the vehicle.77  At the same time, one 
of the patrolmen observed the defendant trying to hide an item in the 
center console and feared that he could have a weapon.78  The de-
fendant, at this point, acted nervously and denied that he had any 
weapons on his body or in the vehicle.79  Nevertheless, after receiving 
consent to frisk the defendant and finding no weapons, the officers’, 
without consent, searched the vehicle on a hunch that there was a 
concealed item that could potentially harm them.80  One officer “no-
ticed that there was a small drawer at the back of the center console 
all the way at the bottom which was partially open, just a small bit, 
maybe a quarter of an inch” when shining his flashlight into the de-
fendant’s vehicle.81  The officers then found a firearm in the center 
console of the back seat and placed the defendant under arrest.82 
Concluding that the officers’ were not justified in searching 
the vehicle, the Circuit Court reasoned that the officers’ fear that the 
defendant had been armed and dangerous lacked merit.83  Even 
though the officers witnessed the defendant conceal an item into the 
 
Hart, 674 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2012) (defendant bent over and cradled an object against his 
waistband); United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 2013) (two men making 
movements in a parked vehicle in connection with exchanging drugs). 
72 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. 
73 Id. 
74 475 F.3d 356 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
75 Id. at 360. 
76 Id. at 357. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 




83 Id. at 359-60. 
9
Miller: Fourth Amendment Inquiries
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
778 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
 
center console of the back seat, the defendant did not have any weap-
ons on his body when he exited the vehicle and consented to be 
searched.84  The fact that the defendant may have concealed an item 
into the console does not create a fear that he had control of a weap-
on.85  The court acknowledged, in addition to the defendant’s nervous 
behavior, that the officers’ search could only be justified if another 
fact to support a reasonable suspicion had been present.86  The court 
stated, “[w]ere nervous behavior alone enough to justify the search of 
a vehicle, the distinction between a stop and a search would lose all 
practical significance, as the stop would routinely—perhaps invaria-
bly—be followed by a search.”87  The officers were not warranted in 
searching the defendant’s vehicle merely because he had acted nerv-
ously and made certain furtive movements.88 
D. A Reasonable Suspicion Must Be Examined Based 
on the Entirety of the Circumstances 
When establishing reasonable suspicion, federal courts re-
quire “that the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—
must be taken into account.”89  In United States v. DeJear,90 the court 
found that the officers had a reasonable suspicion to investigate the 
defendant’s car, which was parked in a private driveway.91  Officer 
Morrison and three officers were patrolling in a high crime area when 
they noticed the defendant and two others seated in the vehicle.92  Af-
ter parking, Morrison observed the passenger seated in the backseat 
gripping a baseball bat.93  Morrison approached the vehicle, causing 
the defendant to become nervous upon seeing him.94  While looking 
at Morrison, the defendant stuffed “his hands—in the back part of the 
front seat towards the bottom . . . in a very erratic and nervous 
 
84 Spinner, 475 F.3d at 359-60. 
85 Id. at 359 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 360. 
88 Id. 
89 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 
90 552 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2009). 
91 Id. at 1198, 1200-01. 
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state.”95  The officer immediately asked to see the defendant’s hands, 
but the defendant would not comply.96  The officer drew his gun and 
induced the defendant to finally comply with his request.97  The of-
ficers searched the vehicle and discovered a firearm and marijuana.98 
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Morrison had provided suf-
ficient evidence to support his position that a reasonable suspicion 
existed to approach and detain the defendant when looking at the cir-
cumstances as a whole.99  Morrison had approached the vehicle and 
witnessed the defendant attempt to conceal something.100  Further-
more, the vehicle had been parked in a high crime area where the of-
ficer had previously observed gang members standing around.101  Fi-
nally, the passenger in the backseat had been in possession of a 
baseball bat.102  When taking all these facts into account, in addition 
to the defendant’s nervous state, the court found Morrison’s actions 
to be justified.103 
Even though the federal courts have held that the presence of 
suspicious movements in a high crime area raises a reasonable suspi-
cion, at least one recent case has indicated the opposite.  In United 
States v. Hill,104 the court held that the officers did not produce “spe-
cific articulable facts warranting reasonable suspicion of criminal ac-
tivity” when they approached the defendant’s parked vehicle.105  The 
defendant and his girlfriend were parked in front of her apartment, 
which was located in a high crime area at 11:00 p.m.106  Officers 
Burch and Fowler parked near the defendant’s vehicle.107  After the 
two suspects noticed the police car, the girlfriend exited the vehicle 
and quickly strolled to the apartment entrance.108  Fowler approached 
 




99 Id. at 1200-201. 
100 DeJear, 552 F.3d at 1200. 
101 Id. at 1200-201. 
102 Id. at 1201. 
103 Id. 
104 752 F.3d 1029 (5th Cir. 2014). 
105 Id. at 1038. 
106 Id. at 1030-031. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 1032.  Officer Fowler testified that “[t]hey were sitting in a car; when we pulled 
up, she gets out and moves away quickly.  I’ve seen it happen before in situations like this, 
11
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the vehicle and requested to speak with the defendant.109  The de-
fendant opened the driver’s side door, and Fowler immediately asked, 
“[w]here’s your gun?”110  The defendant denied the existence of a 
firearm and could not produce a driver’s license.111  The defendant 
exited his vehicle at the officer’s request, and Fowler proceeded to 
search him for weapons.112  The officer found a gun and placed him 
under arrest.113 
The court held that the encounter that took place in the high 
crime area and the girlfriend’s nervous movements did not give rise 
to a plausible justification for the officers’ actions.114  The officers 
could not point to specific criminal activity where the encounter took 
place, but could only acknowledge that there had recently been homi-
cides in the county.115  Furthermore, the fact that the confrontation 
took place at a late hour on a Saturday night was not significant be-
cause “[n]o reasonable officer who happens upon a couple sitting in a 
car in an apartment complex parking lot on a weekend night would, 
without more, suspect criminal activity.”116  The girlfriend’s quick 
exit and approach to the apartment did not give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion.117  The officers only witnessed the suspects in the vehicle 
for a few seconds before she egressed.118  Because the officers had no 
reason to suspect criminal activity when they approached the com-
plex, her exit could have been for a multitude of reasons.119  Based on 
the circumstances presented before the court, the officers lacked a 
reasonable suspicion.120 
 
and we have encountered narcotics in situations like that before.”  Hill, 752 F.3d at 1032 (in-
ternal quotations omitted). 
109 Id. at 1032. 
110 Id. (internal quotation ommitted). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Hill, 752 F.3d at 1032. 
114 Id. at 1037-38. 
115 Id. at 1035. 
116 Id. at 1036. 
117 Id. 
118 Hill, 752 F.3d at 1037. 
119 Id. at 1037.  The court stated, “she could have exited the car out of a desire to flee from 
the police; or, she could have simply exited the car because Hill drove her home, they fin-
ished saying their ‘goodbyes,’ and she was preparing to go inside.”  Id. 
120 Id. at 1038. 
12
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V. THE NEW YORK STATE APPROACH 
A. People v. De Bour 
In New York, every citizen has the “right to be left alone.”121  
When an officer has an objective basis in concluding that the circum-
stances are ripe to take action, the subsequent events will be subject-
ed to the proper safeguards.122  This limitation is prescribed in People 
v. De Bour.123  The central issue in this case was whether a law en-
forcement agent patrolling on a public street can legally confront a 
citizen, without a material indication that the individual has engaged 
in criminal activity, in an effort to request information.124  Officer 
Kenneth Steck and his partner were patrolling on foot in Brooklyn, 
where they witnessed Louis De Bour walking down the street at 
12:15 a.m.125  When the officers were within forty feet of De Bour, he 
strangely crossed the street.126  The officers followed De Bour, ap-
proached him and inquired into his reasons for being in the neighbor-
hood.127  After the defendant nervously answered the question, Steck 
requested identification, which the defendant could not produce.128  
Subsequently, Steck observed a protuberance near the bottom of De 
Bour’s jacket.129  The officer demanded that De Bour open up his 
jacket, and the defendant complied.130  Steck discovered a loaded re-
volver and placed De Bour under arrest.131 
Before the New York Court of Appeals, De Bour argued that 
he had been “seized” under the Fourth Amendment when the officers 
approached him and restricted his right to leave.132  Invoking People 
 
121 De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 569. 
122 See id. at 575. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 565. 
125 Id. 
126 De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 565. 
127 Id. 
128 Id.  De Bour told the officers that he was on his way to his friend’s home and had re-
cently parked his vehicle.  Id. 
129 Id. 
130 De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 565. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 566.  De Bour contended “that he was deprived of his freedom of movement by 
the obvious show of authority and the equally obvious display of force by virtue of his being 
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v. Cantor,133 a Court of Appeals case decided one year earlier, De 
Bour contended that the officers’ actions amounted to an unconstitu-
tional seizure because they had no “founded suspicion predicated on 
specific articulable facts that criminal activity [was] afoot.”134  The 
prosecution, also relying on Cantor, asserted that the officers’ actions 
were justified because De Bour had crossed the street in an area 
known for narcotics transactions in order to evade the police.135  The 
Court of Appeals stated that the appropriate test for measuring the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure under Cantor “requires a weigh-
ing of the government’s interest against the encroachment involved 
with respect to an individual’s right to privacy and personal securi-
ty.”136  When balancing these competing interests, a court must de-
termine whether the officer was justified in initiating the inquiry, and 
whether the scope of the measures was proportionate to the circum-
stances.137  The court explained that an officer is justified to investi-
gate into criminal activity only if there is a founded suspicion that the 
suspect is engaging in criminal conduct.138  Furthermore, an officer 
cannot validate his actions “by a subsequently acquired suspicion re-
sulting from the stop.”139 
The court in De Bour held that the officers did not violate the 
defendant’s constitutional rights because the inquiry had been justi-
fied from its inception and was appropriate in scope.140  The court 
further concluded that De Bour had not been “seized” as defined in 
Cantor.141  Steck and his partner were permitted to approach the de-
fendant for the purpose of identification because the detention had 
been brief, aimed at preventing a potential narcotics transaction, and 
did not place the defendant in a frightening or humiliating position.142  
 
outnumbered by armed officers.”  Id. 
133 324 N.E.2d 872, 876 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that the defendant had been “seized” when 
three officers surrounded him and restricted his ability to leave). 





139 De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 566. 
140 Id. at 571. 
141 Id. at 567 (“[Defining] a seizure of the person for constitutional purposes to be a signif-
icant interruption with an individual’s liberty of movement.”) (citing Cantor, 324 N.E.2d at 
876). 
142 Id. at 570. 
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De Bour had suspiciously crossed the street after midnight in an area 
commonly known for drug activity to avoid any interaction with the 
officers.143  Additionally, Steck did not exceed his authority when 
asking De Bour to display what was inside of his jacket.144  The of-
ficer believed the bulge to be a firearm, and this contention was in 
fact reasonable when taking into account the events as a whole.145  
Steck did not conduct an overly intrusive search, but rather asked the 
defendant to unzip his jacket and did not grab him until noticing the 
firearm.146  Therefore, the search was not excessive in scope.147 
More critical than the adjudication itself, De Bour provided a 
long lasting standard; reformed and expanded from Cantor.148  This 
four-level police inquiry standard provides: 
The minimal intrusion of approaching to request in-
formation is permissible when there is some objective 
credible reason for that interference not necessarily 
indicative of criminality.  The next degree, the com-
mon-law right to inquire, is activated by founded sus-
picion that criminal activity is afoot and permits a 
somewhat greater intrusion in that a policeman is enti-
tled to interfere with a citizen to the extent necessary 
to gain explanatory information, but short of a forcible 
seizure.  Where a police officer entertains a reasonable 
suspicion that a particular person has committed, is 
committing or is about to commit a felony or misde-
meanor, the CPL authorizes a forcible stop and deten-
tion of that person.  A corollary of the statutory right 
to temporarily detain for questioning is the authority to 
frisk if the officer reasonably suspects that he is in 
danger of physical injury by virtue of the detainee be-
ing armed.  Finally a police officer may arrest and take 
into custody a person when he has probable cause to 
believe that person has committed a crime, or offense 
 
143 Id. 
144 De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 570. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 571. 
148 Id. 
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in his presence.149 
The court noted that this should be seen as a step-by-step analysis, 
and officers must only act on an objective notion when confronting a 
citizen in public.150  Additionally, this test “directly correlates the de-
gree of objective credible belief with the permissible scope of inter-
ference.”151  This inquiry, which is still the standard in New York, 
has been applied to countless situations. 
B. An Objective Credible Reason Is Mandated when 
Approaching a Vehicle 
The New York courts have decided numerous cases where an 
officer unjustifiably approaches a vehicle.152  These cases are ana-
lyzed on the facts and circumstances of each specific encounter.  For 
example, in People v. Spencer,153 the court held that officers were not 
justified in pulling the defendant over pursuant to a report of an as-
sault that occurred the day before.154  The officers, who were accom-
panied by the complainant, patrolled the community looking for her 
boyfriend.155  After driving with the officers for about five minutes, 
the complainant identified the defendant seated in a parked vehicle.156  
The defendant was her boyfriend’s friend who may have had 
knowledge of the suspect’s whereabouts.157  As the defendant began 
to drive away, the officers turned on the police vehicle’s lights and 
 
149 De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 571. 
150 Id. at 572. 
151 Id. 
152 See People v. Ocasio, 652 N.E.2d 907, 908 (N.Y. 1995) (finding that officers were jus-
tified to approach the defendant’s vehicle when doing so on foot and not forcibly detaining 
the defendant by using the police vehicle’s sirens); People v. Brown, 492 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 
(App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1985) (holding that undercover officers in a high-crime neighborhood 
violated the defendant’s rights when approaching the defendant’s vehicle after witnessing a 
conversation between the defendant and a woman; the woman entered the car, and the de-
fendant “made a series of sharp lurching movements backwards and forwards”); People v. 
Thomas, 792 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473-74 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005) (holding that an officer is 
authorized to approach and investigate the driver of a vehicle parked in front of a fire hy-
drant because only a licensed driver can be legally parked next to the still object). 
153 646 N.E.2d 785 (N.Y. 1995). 
154 Id. at 786, 790. 
155 Id. 786. 
156 Id. at 786-87. 
157 Id. 
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pulled the defendant over.158  The officers walked up to the vehicle 
and inspected the car’s interior with their flashlights.159  The officers 
noticed a translucent bag containing marijuana below the female pas-
senger’s seat.160  The defendant and the female passenger exited the 
car at the request of the officers, and a subsequent search of the vehi-
cle revealed a loaded firearm, in addition to the marijuana.161 
The court found that the officers’ initial decision to approach 
the defendant’s vehicle was not supported by a specific, articulable 
basis.162  The court made a critical distinction between the standards 
placed on an officer when forcibly stopping a vehicle and inquiring 
into a pedestrian’s whereabouts.163  This distinction is important due 
to the fact that he had been parked and began to drive away when the 
inquiry first occurred.164  The court stated: 
Although the right to stop a vehicle is generally analo-
gous to the right to stop a pedestrian, police/motorist 
encounters must be distinguished from po-
lice/pedestrian encounters when the police are operat-
ing on less than reasonable suspicion.  This is because 
“the obvious impact of stopping the progress of an au-
tomobile is more intrusive than the minimal intrusion 
involved in stopping a pedestrian” and constitutes “at 
least a limited seizure subject to constitutional limita-
tions,” whereas the common-law right of inquiry—
much less the right to request information—does not 
include the right to unlawfully seize.165 
For constitutional purposes, a vehicle is effectively seized when an 
officer pulls the vehicle over.166  Furthermore, the court reasoned that 
the officers were not justified in stopping the vehicle simply because 
the defendant could have knowledge of where the suspect might be, 
 




162 Id. at 790. 
163 Spencer, 646 N.E.2d at 787. 
164 Id. at 786-87. 
165 Id. at 787  (internal citations omitted). 
166 Id. 
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especially when less invasive measures could be used.167  The offic-
ers did not inquire into the defendant’s whereabouts before the com-
plainant identified him; but the officers could have gone to the de-
fendant’s home if they believed he had any knowledge of where the 
suspect could be.168  The inquiry occurred almost two days after the 
assault had been reported.169  Lastly, the defendant had not been ap-
proached because he was suspected of committing the assault, but ra-
ther to potentially provide information about the suspect’s location.170  
Taking all of those considerations into account, the officers’ actions 
were not justified.171 
When an officer acts solely on a hunch of criminal wrongdo-
ing, the New York courts have held that the encounter is unjust from 
its inception.172  In People v. Sobotker,173 the court held that the de-
fendant had been unlawfully seized under the Fourth Amendment 
when the officers pulled the defendant’s vehicle over because they 
“felt that a crime was about to be committed.”174  The two officers 
were parked in an illuminated area where multiple burglaries had re-
cently taken place.175  The plain clothed patrolmen witnessed the de-
fendant’s vehicle approach an intersection and oddly slow down near 
a local bar.176  Similar to the first instance, the men looked over at 
another bar when at the stop sign.177  Based on those events, the of-
ficers decided to forcibly pull the vehicle over.178  After the defendant 
could not supply appropriate documents for the vehicle or identifica-
tion, the officers searched the men.179  The officer’s found five bullets 
 
167 Id. at 790. 
168 Spencer, 646 N.E.2d at 789. 
169 Id. at 789. 
170 Id. at 790. 
171 Id. 
172 See People v. Howard, 542 N.Y.S.2d 536, 540 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1989) (stating that 
the defendant’s presence in a “robbery prone” area can be considered when justifying a 
hunch, but standing alone does not justify the assertion).  The court held that the officers had 
no objective reason to approach the defendant who had been standing on the street corner.  
Id. 
173 373 N.E.2d 1218 (N.Y. 1978). 
174 Id. at 1220 (internal quotations omitted). 
175 Id. at 1219. 
176 Id.  There had been a stop sign at the corner of the intersection; the vehicle’s speed di-
minished to around five miles per hour, and the men looked briefly towards the local bar.  Id. 
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on one of the passengers and a firearm in the vehicle.180 
The Court of Appeals, in finding that the officers’ hunch did 
not support any confirmation of wrongdoing, stated, “the seemingly 
innocuous act of the defendant and his companions in glancing at a 
bar, even if it could be argued that they were then driving through a 
‘high crime neighborhood,’ did not reasonably denote criminal con-
duct.”181  When the men glanced at the second bar, they were proper-
ly stopped at a stop sign.182  The court did recognize, however, that if 
the officers had been patient and waited for the events to unfold, then 
they might have lawfully uncovered criminal activity.183  The fact 
that the officers acted, rather than waited, did not justify the finding 
that at least one of the men was armed because if “hindsight alone 
[were] to furnish the governing criteria, a vital constitutional safe-
guard of our personal security would soon be gone.”184 
C.  Reasonable Suspicion of Criminality 
Much like the federal courts, the Court of Appeals has exam-
ined cases for the purpose of determining whether or not an officer 
had a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct to justify an in-
quiry.185  It has been established that “[r]reasonable suspicion is the 
quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent cau-
tious man under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at 
hand.”186  For instance, in People v. May,187 the court held that the of-
ficers did not have a reasonable suspicion to suspect any criminal 
conduct.188  The defendant and female passenger were sitting in the 
defendant’s car, which was parked on an abandoned street in a high 
 
180 Id. at 1219-220. 
181 Id. at 1220-221. 
182 Sobotker, 372 N.E.2d at 1221. 
183 Id.  The court noted “the premature juncture at which the police did in fact act in this 
instance, they had come upon no fruit ready for harvesting.”  Id. 
184 Id. 
185 See Harrison, 443 N.E.2d at 452 (holding that the officers’ lacked a reasonable suspi-
cion because the defendant’s rental car had been dirty); People v. Heston, 543 N.Y.S.2d 803, 
804 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1989) (finding a reasonable suspicion when an “officer then ob-
served a rolled dollar bill in plain view on the floor of the vehicle.  He testified that his expe-
rience informed him that rolled bills were used to ingest cocaine.”). 
186 Cantor, 324 N.E.2d at 877. 
187 609 N.E.2d 113 (N.Y. 1992). 
188 Id. at 115. 
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crime area.189  At around 2:30 a.m., two officers drove behind the de-
fendant’s vehicle and proceeded to turn the vehicle’s turret lights 
on.190  As the defendant began to drive away, the officers commanded 
through the vehicle’s loudspeaker that the defendant pull over.191  Af-
ter the defendant complied, the officers requested identification and 
questioned the defendant.192  Subsequently, the officers learned, after 
running the license plate, that the car had been stolen and arrested the 
defendant.193  A subsequent search revealed a finding of crack co-
caine.194 
In deciding to suppress the evidence, the Court of Appeals 
found that the officers had “seized” the defendant when “using red 
turret lights, a spotlight and a loudspeaker, [and] ordered the defend-
ant to pull the car over . . . .”195  Because a seizure had occurred, the 
only way for the stop to be acceptable was if a reasonable suspicion 
existed.196  The court determined that the officers had no reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, other than the fact that the inquiry oc-
curred on an abandoned street and in an area commonly known for 
criminal activity.197  The defendant’s conduct did not rise to the level 
of reasonable suspicion because the defendant was entitled “to be let 
alone” when he drove away from the officers.198 
VI. TWO DIFFERENT, BUT SIMILAR STANDARDS 
Both the Terry and De Bour approaches have substantially 
evolved over the last 50 years.  In particular, the analysis of parked 
vehicles has provided the necessary safeguards for each and every 
citizen to live freely without arbitrary police intrusions.199  These pro-
 
189 Id. at 114. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 




196 Id. at 114-15. 
197 May, 609 N.E.2d at 114-15. 
198 Id. at 115.  (internal quotations omitted). 
199 See, e.g., United States v. See, 574 F.3d 309, 311 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that the of-
ficers lacked a reasonable suspicion to approach the defendant’s parked vehicle located in a 
high crime area at 4:30 A.M.); People v. Morrison, 555 N.Y.S.2d 183, 184-85 (App. Div. 2d 
Dep’t 1990) (stating that defendant’s parked vehicle with the motor on in a neighborhood 
20
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tections were proven strong in Laviscount when the Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department vacated the defendant’s conviction.200  No 
evidence had been presented to the effect that Laviscount had been 
doing anything unlawful when seated in his parked car at a late hour; 
yet the officer arbitrarily decided to approach the defendant’s vehicle 
based on nothing more than his gut feeling that criminal activity was 
occurring.201  A car simply parked in a strange area is nothing more 
than that, a parked car in a strange area.  However, when other factors 
are presented, as such were in DeJear, an officer could be justified to 
approach a suspect’s vehicle.202 
Had Laviscount’s case been brought in federal court, the out-
come might have been different.  Rather than the inflexible and grad-
ual approach established in De Bour, the Terry analysis might have 
provided a sufficient basis to convict Laviscount and uphold a con-
viction.203  A federal court, looking at the circumstances as a whole, 
could have accepted the argument that a car parked at a late hour in a 
remote area with the driver engaging in skeptical movements provid-
ed reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.  The federal approach 
does not hinge on a step-by-step analysis.  Rather than stopping the 
analysis at the initial approach as the court properly did in 
Laviscount, a federal court might have taken into account the defend-
ant’s actions when Ranolde pulled alongside Laviscount’s vehicle.204  
The gradual New York approach did not take into consideration any 
of the defendant’s actions after Ranolde pulled up next to the vehi-
cle.205  If his furtive movements were taken into account, the prosecu-
tor could have had a stronger argument to convict Laviscount and 
uphold the verdict.206 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Police officers are scrutinized, after the fact, about the deci-
sions they make or choose not to make.  The courts are in place to 
 
known for crime did not provide a reasonable suspicion to conduct a search and seizure). 
200 See Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 397. 
201 Id. 
202 See DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196. 
203 See Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 396-97. 
204 Id. at 396; see Terry, 392 U.S. 1; De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562. 
205 Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 396-97. 
206 See id. at 397. 
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retrospectively evaluate their conduct and determine whether they 
exceeded the bounds of their authority.  However, each encounter 
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  Officers are involved in 
situations where they must act quickly, but that does not exempt them 
from abiding by the appropriate safeguards.  Nevertheless, police of-
ficer safety and judgment must be given its appropriate weight in 
these inquires due to the nature of their duty.  In sum, the courts must 
continue to strike an appropriate balance between freedom and safety 
in order for citizens to feel comfortable when a police-initiated en-
counter occurs. 
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